Business Cycle and Crime: The Case of British Columbia, Canada

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Abstract:

Purpose: Economic expansions and contractions are among the factors that influence crime as a social phenomenon. Yet, the magnitude of the impact of economic growth and recession has remained largely unexplored in British Columbia (BC). In this study, the reference business cycle variable (GDP) is measured in relation to four crime categories: fraud, robbery, violence, and property crimes.

Design/methodology/approach: We collected data from Statistics Canada on various socioeconomic indicators for the period of 1986-2019. We employed ARDL method and dependent tests based on Hamza and Lau (2013) and Oyelade (2019) to estimate the causal effects.

Findings: Our results do not support any long-run relationships among various crime categories and business cycles. However, we found statistically significant short-term effects of business cycles on crime categories. Economic prosperity has reduced crime in all four categories in the short term, while the recession has caused crime to increase. Furthermore, increasing the number of police officers during our study did not reduce these types of crimes except for property crimes.

Practical implications: The results of the paper can help the policy makers and the BC government determine what types of crime will increase or decrease when there is an economic recession or boom, which can then help the government and justice system plan ahead in order to control crime occurrences.

Originality value: This study is noteworthy as the research methodology and time series data used in this research are for the first time in British Columbia.

Keywords: Business Cycle, Crime, British Colombia, ARDL.

JEL Classification Numbers: E32, K42.

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1. Introduction

Some researchers such as Blekesaune (2007) and Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007) believe that economic conditions can impact social problems since social welfare can maintain desirable levels by improving economic conditions. Of the numerous social problems linked to economic conditions, this study focuses on crime. Generally, crime refers to an act that violates codified law (Barton-Crosby, 2018). Times of economic prosperity are expected to increase production and employment, while economic recessions generally lead to job losses, falling production, and unemployment (Mukoyama and Sahin, 2006). There are some instances in which crime in a geographical area can be caused by economic prosperity, while in other instances recession leads to an increase in some of crimes. Thus, the relationships among economic growth/recession and crime remain an empirical question.

According to Brand and Price, crime incurs social and economic costs in public and private spheres. For example, loss of property, assets, court costs, and deterrent equipment like closed circuit televisions (CCTV), alarms, and insurance costs are among the private costs, while public costs may include increased monitoring police organizations, courts, and prisons. Therefore, crime is an undesirable social phenomenon that threatens economic and social security (Brand and Price, 2000). Criminal acts such as theft, fraud, robbery, and violence seem like negative social phenomena. Given that these components may not behave the same depending on economic conditions, a greater understanding of the crime's sub-segments is required. Regardless of economic conditions, it is critical to identify whether which types of crime are increased or decreased impacted by the business cycles.

This study investigated the effect of business cycles on crime in British Columbia (BC), Canada, between 1986 and 2019. We estimated the size of the impact of economic expansions and contractions on different crime categories, including fraud, robbery, violence, and property crimes. Moreover, we determined the effect of inflation, unemployment, the number of tourists entering the province, the number of police officers, and the Gini coefficient on the occurrence of these four categories of crime (i.e., fraud, robbery, violence, and property crimes). We analyzed all these effects within short-term and long-term contexts. We collected all data from publicly available crime statistics (i.e., Statics Canada). All time-series were cross checked with Statistics Canada agents to ensure the consistency of reported numbers for the duration of the sample.

The research method in this paper is one of the efficient convergence techniques, known as ARDL model. The models are mainly based on the works of Hamza and Lau (2013) and Oyelade (2019). The number of crimes in the four categories was used as the dependent variable, and the reference cycle variable was used as an independent variable. We also controlled for other socioeconomic variables, such as unemployment, inflation rate, the number of police officers, the number of tourists,

and the Gini coefficient. After ensuring that all variables were stationary,³ we evaluated the models' significance and stability by performing various tests such as the Bound test, the Jarque-Bera test for normality, Breusch-Godfrey for serial correlation, LM Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey for heteroskedasticity, Ramsey reset, and CUSUM test.

Our results show that these models are significant in the short run between 1986 and 2019. Based on the four crime models' evidence, we concluded that economic recessions increase crime in these four categories (fraud, rubbery, property crime and crime of violence), and economic growth has an adverse effect on these crimes. Therefore, based on these results, the initial impression of this relationship has been confirmed. More specifically, our results showed that a one million Canadian dollar increase in BC's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the prosperity will reduce property crimes by approximately 5.2 units. This effect, however, is not symmetric. We found that during recession, property crimes increase by approximately 11.4 units for a one million Canadian dollar decrease in BC's GDP.⁴

Our results can help policymakers and the BC government determine what kinds of crimes will increase or decrease during recessions or economic prosperity, which has the potential to help the government and relevant sectors within the criminal justice system develop crime prevention strategies. Among the users of these results are the Planning Institute of British Columbia (PIBC), the British Columbia Police Association (BCPA) to use specialized forces when necessary, and the Prisons Organization in BC for preparing to accept specialized criminals.

The next section describes the theoretical and practical literature review on this field. In the third section, we examine the state of the four categories of crimes and their components in BC, which is followed by an explanation of the study's data in section four. We present the statistical models in section five, and the sixth section shows the study's estimates and empirical results. Finally, we discuss the findings and provide conclusions in section seven.

2. Literature Review

Becker (1968) is one of the earliest studies to show the interconnections among crime and economics with three factors. According to Becker (1968), the probability of arrest and the severity of punishment reduces crime directly, and positive social indicators increase legal activities and work as a controller to crime. Becker (1968) believed that people purchase goods and services based on a cost-benefit analysis. Still, in the pattern of individual behavior, individuals' decisions about committing a crime are different. In his model, he claimed that people do not commit an offense if the costs of committing a crime outweigh their benefits in the United States in 1965.

³We used Dicky Fuller unit root test for all variables stationary separately. ⁴British Columbia's median GDP in our sample is 141932.5 million dollars. Accordingly, potential offenders decide by comparing the regular income and the income and risk of committing a crime. If the advantages of the crime outweigh the legal work benefits, they turn to illegal acts (Becker, 1968).

After Becker's examination of the relationships among economic variables and crime, many studies examined the economics index and Crime (for example, see Howsen and Jarrell, 1987). The key findings of these studies at that the main effects of the macroeconomic view on crime were the impact of both unemployment and economic growth on crime (Cantor and Land, 1985; Cohen and Felson, 1970; Kennedy and Forde, 1990) and, in recent years, about unemployment and crime (Andresen and Linning, 2016). Also some researches addressed the subject of economic growth and crime (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1996; Glaeser, 1999; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 2004; Goulas and Zervoyianni, 2013).

In 2018, Sameem and Sylwester studied the relationship between the crime rate and the unemployment rate (i.e., as a business cycle indicator) during 1990-2013. Their (2018) study showed that the effect of unemployment on home theft, car theft, and violent crime depends on the city or village's size. The results show that, unemployment has a strong effect on domestic crime and theft and a weak effect on violent crime. According to their article, the size of the area was a significant explanatory variable. Most of the time, there is a positive relationship between property crime and unemployment in more populous areas (Sameem and Sylwester, 2018).

Andresen and Linning (2016) examine how unemployment impacts crime specialization in the ten Canadian provinces between 1981 and 2009. Using panel data and a hybrid modeling approach, they find that unemployment affects crime specialization. However, this influence varies in strength and by crime type. They believe that rising unemployment leads to increased specialization of assault and shoplifting, which may be representative of the increased social stress of unemployment. They also believe that with rising unemployment, alcohol consumption may increase and this may increase crime of violence.

In addition, they say, during recessions, people spend more time at home and are better able to protect person and property. In a related paper, Nordin and Almen (2017) study the effects of unemployment on crime. However, instead of using the unemployment variable, they have specifically used long-term unemployment as an independent variable. They believe that the longer duration of unemployment has a more significant impact on crime, especially violent crimes. They believe that longterm unemployment is likely to create a strain that leads to violent behavior. Moreover, in addition to creating direct costs, unemployment also indirectly imposes costs on society due to the costs of crime. Also, they argue that violent crimes usually tend to be more costly than property crimes. Although the Bound test results do not support any long-term relationships in our models, yet, we used unemployment as an independent variable.

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Cook and Zarkin (1985) proposed a particular theoretical framework for expressing the relationship between economic contraction and crime. According to them (1985), on the one hand, recession can reduce the opportunity to achieve a desirable life, and therefore offset the proceeds of crime; the reason is recession increases the motivation for criminal activity by reducing the opportunity cost and time spent on illegal activities, including reducing the opportunity cost and time spent in prison.

As for the younger generation, during the recession, the enrollment rate in schools and universities decreases, and this segment of society also has enough time and motivation to join criminal activities. On the other hand, recession can also have a direct impact on the quality of criminal opportunities (Cook and Zarkin, 1985). In the time of recession, property owners spend more time protecting their property; thus, crime and theft numbers may be reducing. For the fundamental theoretical part of our study, after Baker (1968), we took inspiration from this paper about the cause and effect relationship of the recession on crime.

From 25 years of economic and public health research, Cook (2007) concludes that higher indirect taxes on alcohol, as well as other supply constraints, reduce their effects by reducing moderate consumption. Cook (2007) suggested that driving while intoxicated is reduced due to reduced alcohol consumption during a recession. He stated that a specific pattern could not be achieved for drugs. Further, recession can reduce state and local tax revenues, leading to a reduction in regulatory and judicial processes. As a result, the deterrent effects of the criminal justice system on crime can be debilitating.

This article shows that the recession period reduces the percentage of crime due to reduced incomes. The opposite theory is that some kind of crime like smuggling increases during periods of recession due to rising unemployment and falling opportunity costs of crime. In other words, by increasing the unemployment rate, unemployed people seeking to earn money might become smugglers and increase the incidence of this crime (Barone and Masciandaro, 2018).

Regarding experimental studies, we can refer to Oyelade (2019) that examines the determinants of Crime in Nigeria from economic and social perspectives using time series data from 1990 to 2014. The economic variables are: 1) GDP per capita; 2) male unemployment rate; 3) women's unemployment rate; and 4) the poverty rate (Oyelade, 2019).

Additionally, demographic and social variables include enrollment in higher education, urban population, and rural population. Oyelade's (2019) long-term results by ARDL methodology show that GDP per capita and female unemployment rate increase Nigeria's crime rate, while urban and rural population and male unemployment rate have a positive and significant impact on Nigeria's crime rate. Short-term results also show that GDP per capita and higher education reduce crime rates in Nigeria, while the urban population, male unemployment rate, and poverty

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rate increase crime in this area. We follow a similar methodology and take advantage of the ARDL method, which we identify as the most appropriate estimation method in this context.

Based on Bushway (2012) and Thrasher's (2018) findings, it is clear that a variable such as economic growth may have different effects on crime in different circumstances. For example, a recession may reduce crime, but at the same time, economic prosperity will increase that crime. In other words, the situation here is asymmetrical, which means that variables may affect crime differently. Bushway (2012) analyzed the thirteen business cycles since 1933 to provide evidence of whether recessions cause crime. The author (2012) used data from the United States to show that recessions are strongly associated with an increase in burglary, robbery, and motor vehicle theft, but that does not have anything to do with the murder. These patterns suggest that economic conditions influence crime in various ways independent of statistical association with homicide.

Thrasher (2018) examined the relationship between crime and Mississippi's business cycle. His (2018) results show that increasing legal income reduces a person's willingness to commit a crime. Thrasher (2018) uses regression models to estimate long-term and short-term revenue relationships, violent crime, theft, vandalism, and vehicle theft. His (2018) long-run model shows how revenue growth increases crime growth, and his short-term empirical model shows how income variable affects criminal change. According to the long-run results, with the increase in revenue, theft, and sabotage decrease, and this variable will increase as income decreases. In the short term, theft decreases as income increases, also as income decrease, theft will be increased. He goes on to explain that recessions can cause law enforcement to have fewer resources available to them and it could be one of the reasons to increase theft. Ultimately, Thrasher does not find a long-term or short-term relationship between violent crime or vehicle theft and the business cycle.

3. Crime in British Columbia

British Columbia is the westernmost province in Canada, with Victoria as the capital and Vancouver as the second-most populous city. As the sixth state, it joined the Canadian Confederation in 1871 (Egan, 2013). Approximately 300,000 people lived in the state in the year 1986. By 2020, the population is about 5,147,000 people. This issue means that the population has grown by over 71.5 percent in the past 34 years (see Appendix 1). An increase in the population may also cause several social problems, such as crime. In this section, we will provide an overview of Crime in British Columbia. In the following diagram, we have shown the changes of four types of crimes including fraud, robbery, property crime, and violence, during the study period from 1986 to 2019. As observed in Figure 1, the general trend of changes in the four crimes of our study is not the same.



Figure 1. Time trend for crime categories in British Columbia

Note: To draw figure 1, we used the final data extracted for the model's estimation. *Source:* Statistics Canada.

In a similar fashion to other parts of the country, crime data in BC show the number of crimes reported maybe rapidly increasing over time, like the crime of fraud by a 95% increase during our period. On the other hand, some types of crime decrease such as robbery with about 11% decrease on the same time period. Several factors could be responsible for this; it may be related to the recession, high unemployment, rising poverty rates, or high inflation. Other non-economic factors may also be causal, such as population, number of tourists, and number of police officers. We are using these factors as auxiliary variables in our models to find out the relationship between the business cycle and Crime in BC.

4. Data and Methodology

All data used in these models come from the Statistics Canada website for British Columbia. Changing the crime definition from 1998 posed some challenges in the

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study process⁵, so for earlier data, we get the confirmation from Statistics Canada, and they sent the adjusted data from 1986 till 2019 for all four categories that needed in the article: Crime of Fraud, Crime of Robbery, Property crime, and Crimes of Violence. The final data used in the article are shown in Appendix (2).

In this article, the variables used were defined based on the Bell (2013) report and Statistics Canada website. The Variables identified by the abbreviations CF, CR, CP, CV, GE, UN, INF, PO, TU, and GINI. The definitions of the variables are as follow:

CF: Total fraud is an intentional deception devised to take money or property from an individual or group.

CR: Total robbery, the action of taking property unlawfully from a person or place by force or threat of force.

CP: Property crime is a crime to obtain money, property, or other benefits.

CV: Crime of violence is a crime committed through the using of force or the threat of force.

GE: Business cycle variables, as the reference of GDP we created the business cycle variables, include economic prosperity (GE-POS) and recession (GE-NEG), and we put the income-based gross domestic product in BC (unit to 1,000,000 dollars) in our models.

UN: Unemployment in BC, people whose jobs started within the past four weeks are considered unemployed. Estimates in thousands rounded to the nearest hundred.

INF: The inflation rate (Consumer price index), several items make up the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and the top-level is the "all-items CPI," which we used in our article.

PO: Police personnel in BC, rates are calculated per 100,000 population based on estimations provided by Statistics Canada.

TU: The people who has one or more nights trips as non-resident to British Columbia.

GINI: GINI Coefficient, the Gini coefficient is a measure of how unequal income distribution is between zero and one. In a population with just the same amount of household income received, the coefficient would be zero (minimum inequality). However, a coefficient of one (maximum inequality) occurs if one person receives all the household income while the rest receive none.

In this study, we want to test these hypotheses: Does crime increase during recessions? Does crime decrease during prosperity?

An autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) used for decades; however, this model's importance is to examine long-term relationships between variables

⁵Crime data were available in two categories on the Statistics Canada website: UCR1 (1968-1997) and UCR2 (1998-2019), but due to the changes in the definition of crime variables in these two datasets, we could not use them as the raw data. So, we adjust the data by their definition and got the confirmation from Statistics Canada.

emphasized in recent years. This approach has been developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran *et al.* (2001), Ghatak and Siddiki (2001). The regression model with distributive interrupts has many advantages over Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen and Juselius (1990):

-The ARDL model works better when small samples are involved, whereas the Johansen model is not quite as statistically significant in that situation.

-With the ARDL model, you can explore short-term dynamics as well as long-term relationships.

-Third, in the ARDL approach, selecting a different optimal lag for each variable is possible.

-The ARDL approach is efficient because the endogenous problem does not occur due to the non-correlation of the error terms.

The frame of the ARDL (p, q) model is like equation (1):

$$y_t + \beta_1 y_{t-1} + \dots + \beta_p y_{t-p} = \lambda + \alpha_0 x_t + \alpha_1 x_{t-1} + \dots + \alpha_q x_{t-q} + \varepsilon_t$$

$$(1)$$

 $\beta(L)y_t = \lambda + \alpha(L)x_t + \varepsilon_t$

Where consists of \mathbf{p} lags of dependent variable and \mathbf{q} lags of independent variables. The process is as follows:

In this paper, we used the ARDL method to estimate the models⁶. In the first step, a unit root test should be performed on the time series variables. We used the standard Dickey-Fuller test for the existence of unit root. In this test, the null hypothesis shows that a unit root is present in an autoregressive model, and the alternative hypothesis shows that the variable is stationarity. The primary purpose is to ensure that the variables are not I (2) to avoid false results, so the condition for using the ARDL method is that all variables must be eider I (0) or I (1) (Kripfganz and Schneider, 2016).

In the second step, the ARDL models show in equation 2. We divided crimes into four categories of Crime (Total Fraud, Total Robbery, Total Property Crimes, Total Crimes of Violence). These variables represent in four different models by one equation as follow:

⁶We used E-views 10 (Econometrics views) as an software tool for the estimation.

$$\begin{split} \Delta Y_{t} &= \alpha_{0} + \sum_{i=1}^{\rho} \alpha_{1i} \Delta Y_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_{1}} \alpha_{2i} \Delta GE_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_{2}} \alpha_{3i} \Delta UN_{t-i} + \\ \sum_{i=0}^{q_{3}} \alpha_{4i} \Delta INF_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_{4}} \alpha_{5i} \Delta PO_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_{5}} \alpha_{6i} \Delta TU_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_{6}} \alpha_{7i} \Delta GINI_{t-i} + \\ \delta_{11}CF_{t-1} + \delta_{21}GE_{t-1} + \delta_{31}UN_{t-1} + \delta_{41}INF_{t-1} + \delta_{51}PO_{t-1} + \delta_{61}TU_{t-1} + \\ \delta_{71}GINI_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{1t} \end{split}$$
(2)

Where Y_t is the outcome variable, and it includes CR for the Total Crime of Robbery, CV for the Total Crime of Violence, CP for the Total Crime of Property, CF for the total crime of fraud, and UN refers to the number of unemployed people, INF for the Inflation rate, GE for the Economics Business Cycle⁷, GINI for the Gini coefficient, PO for the total number of police officers, TU is international tourist entering or returning, and ε is disruptive sentence residual.

The next step for ARDL analyses is doing Bound Test. The test uses to determine whether a long-term relationship exists or short-term. This test presented by Pesaran *et al.* (2001) and its null hypothesis indicates no long-term relationship in the model. This test is performed separately for each model. If the F-statistic is less than the lower bound for I(0), long - term relationship does not exist, and if the F-statistic is more than the upper bound for I(1), a long-term relationship exists unless the coefficients have spurious regression. In the short-term estimation, if the F be between these two bounds or higher than I(1), the model could estimate as a short-run. Then, we examine the classical hypotheses tests:

Normality test: If the probability is more than 5%, the assumption of normality approves.

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: If the probability is more than 5%, there is no correlation problem in our model.

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch- Pegan- Godfrey: If the probability is more than 5%, there is no Heteroskedasticity problem in our model.

Ramsey RESET Test⁸: If the probability is more than 5%, then the formulation of the model equation is correct.

Using the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) test and Cumulative Sum-Quadratic (CUSUMQ) are suitable for assessing the stability of the ARDL model, as suggested by Pesaran *et al.* (2001). So, we use these tests to show the model's stability as a final test. There is no causality test because we accept the function by the basic theory from historical review.

⁷The main independent variable in the models is the business cycle, which is defined based on the GDP reference variable. When the model is estimated, two data columns are created for recession and prosperity, which by definition, in the recession variable does not include GDP growth and in the prosperity period, its reduction is not considered. The two variables GE-pos and GE-Neg indicate respectively the state of prosperity and recession in British Columbia during the period under review.

⁸*Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET)*

5. Empirical Results

In this study, the number of models analyzes separately for different categories of crime used in the study, namely, Fraud, Robbery, property crime, and violent Crime for British Columbia over the period 1986-2019. Eventually, the authors test the stationary of the variables by Dicky -fuller unit root test as shown in Table 1.

Symbol	Variables	Probability
CF	Criminal of Fraud	0.6766
$\Delta \mathrm{CF}$	First difference of CF	0.0197
CR	Crime of Robbery	0.8069
ΔCR	First difference of CR	0.0037
СР	Crimes of Property	0.0208
ΔCP	First difference of CP	-
CV	Crimes of Violence	0.0904
$\Delta \mathrm{CV}$	First difference of CV	-
GE_NEG	Contraction phase of business cycle	0.8327
ΔGE_NEG	First difference of GE-NEG	0.0000
GE_POS	Expansion phase of business cycle	1.0000
ΔGE_{POS}	First difference of GE-POS	0.0218
UN	Unemployment	0.6593
Δ UN	First difference of UN	0.0046
INF	Inflation	0.0337
Δ INF	First difference of INF	-
PO	Number of police	0.9995
ΔΡΟ	First difference of PO	0.0367
TU	Number of tourists	0.7377
ΔTU	First difference of TU	0.0597
GINI	Income inequality	0.3440
ΔGINI	First difference of GINI	0.0003

 Table 1. Panel unit root test result

Notes: The third column of the table indicates p-value for all variables individually. We take the first difference for each variable that was not significant by at least 90% probability on level (I(0)). CP, CV, and INF are stationary in levels (I(0)), which don't need the first difference. For using ARDL as a method of estimation in this article, the condition is that all variables be stationary in I(0) or I(1). The results show that these data can be used in the ARDL model.

Source: The author's calcuations

As shown in Table 1, all the variables are stationary (at 10% level of significance) by the first difference, except the three variables: CP, CV, and INF, which are stationary (I(0)), and taking the first different is not required for them. Thus, we can use all variables to estimate the model with the ARDL method.

To analyze long-term relationships, we use Bounds tests. Table 2 shows the results for the long-term Bound tests for each crime type separately. Table 2 provides

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critical value information for all models at three levels of significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% for lower bound (I(0)) and upper bound(I(1)).

Model specification	F	1% significance		5% significance		10% sign	nificance	Conclusion
	statistic	Lower bound (I(0))	Upper bound (I(1))	Lower bound (I(0))	Upper bound (I(1))	Lower bound (I(0))	Upper bound (I(1))	ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test
Total, Fraud	1.84	2.73	3.9	2.17	3.21	1.92	2.89	Non Cointegration
Total, Robbery	1.06	2.73	3.9	2.17	3.21	1.92	2.89	Non Cointegration
Total, Property Crimes	1.11	2.54	3.9	1.97	3.18	1.7	2.83	Non Cointegration
Total, Crimes of Violence	1.45	2.54	3.9	1.97	3.18	1.7	2.83	Non Cointegration

Table 2. Bound test results (Long Run)

Notes: The results of this table are used to determine whether the relationship is long-term or not. We specify this subject by the amount of F-statistics in the models. The amount of Fstatistic in the first model is 1.84, which is lower than the lower bound in all levels of accepted confidence. The F-statistic for the following three models is 1.06, 1.11, and 1.45, respectively, which are all lower than I(0). It shows us that the long-term relationship does not exist, and we need to check the result of table 3 to be sure that there is a short-term relationship or not.

Source: The author's calculations

According to the Bounds test results in all four models, the F-statistic is less than the lower bound for I(0), so long - term relationship does not exist, and we check the bound test in short-run models.

In the next step, we employ the short-term Bounds tests. Table 3 shows the results for the short-term Bound tests for each crime type separately. The table provides critical value information for all models at three levels of significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% for lower bound (I(0)) and upper bound(I(1)). As mentioned before, the model estimates as a short-run if the F-statistic is within these two limits or higher than I(1).

			Critical values					
Model specification	F-	1% significance		5% significance		10% significance		Conclusion
	statistic	Lower bound (I(0))	Upper bound (I(1))	Lower bound (I(0))	Upper bound (I(1))	Lower bound (I(0))	Upper bound (I(1))	ARDL Error Correction Regression
Total, Fraud	9.60	3.6	4.9	2.87	4	2.53	3.59	Cointegration
Total, Robbery	3.06	2.73	3.9	2.17	3.21	1.92	2.89	Cointegration
Total, Property Crimes	5.55	2.54	3.91	1.97	3.18	1.7	2.83	Cointegration
Total, Crimes of Violence	3.8	3.07	4.23	2.5	3.5	2.22	3.17	Cointegration

Table 3. Bound test results (Error Correction Regression)

Notes: The results of this table are used to determine whether the relationship is short-term or not. We specify this subject by the amount of *F*-statistics in the models. The amount of *F*-statistic in the first model is 9.60, which is higher than the upper bound in all levels of

accepted confidence. The F-statistic for the following two models is 3.06, 5.55, which are higher than I(1), and the last model's F-statistic is 3.8, which is between two bounds by 1% significant and higher than I(1) in the other levels of significance. Since the F-statistic falls between I(0) and I(1), or higher than I(1), short term relationship is confirmed. **Source:** The author's calculations.

Thus, according to all test results, Since we have an F-statistic which falls between these two bounds or is higher than I(1), a short-term relationship is confirmed for all models. After the bound test results and the diagnosis of short-term period length for the models, we present data analysis and classical tests in Table 4.

Symbol	Variables	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:	Model 4:
Symbol	v arrables	CF	CR	CP	CV
CE DOS	CDD Prosperity	-0.088433	-0.086694	-5.218253	-0.169603
GE_FOS	ODF Flospenty	(0.0486)	(0.0000)	(0.0030)	(0.0432)
CE NEC	CDP stagnation	0.267687	0.163752	11.37231	0.614437
GE_NEG	ODF stagilation	(0.0136)	(0.0034)	(0.0102)	(0.0484)
LINI	Unamployment			545.6151	69.03479
UN	Unemployment	-	=	(0.0290)	(0.0085)
INE	Inflation			5841.401	636.4749
1111	IIIIation	-	-	(0.0245)	(0.0419)
PO	Number of police	-2.128661	0.950280	-109.1326	-2.736427
FO	Number of police	(0.0057)	(0.0012)	(0.0014)	(0.0521)
TI	Number of	-0.002031	0.000602	-0.041570	0.008125
10	tourists	(0.0043)	(0.0097)	(0.0070)	(0.0012)
CINI	Incomo inconclity		19589.93	1949071	
GINI	income mequanty	-	(0.0122)	(0.0055)	-
ECM	Error correction	-0.463530	-0.030825	-0.083028	-0.300118
ECM	model	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0012)	(0.0001)
SUSUM	~	stable	stable	stable	stable
SUSUMQ	Stability	stable	stable	stable	stable
		Diagnostic	Tests		
Heter	roskedasticity	0.68	220.	0.10	0.48
N	Normality	0.60	0.89	0.42	0.40
Ra	msey reset	0.93	0.21	0.25	0.057
Seria	al correlation	0.12	0.12	0.57	0.08

Table 4. ARDL Error Correction Regression⁹

Note: The p-value for each variable is expressed in parentheses. Those Variables that are not recognized as significant are automatically deleted in the software, such as UN, INF and GINI in model 1, and UN and INF in model 2 and GINI in model 3. *Source:* The author's calculations.

According to the table results, the economic expansion shown by GE-POS is significant in all models, also its effect in the third model is more than others. In other words, relative economic expansion plays a greater role in reducing CP among

⁹For the complete software output see the Appendix 3 to 6.

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four offenses. Economic expansion with a coefficient of -5.2 has the highest decrease in crime on the property and with a coefficient of -0.08, it has the least effect on CF and CR. Symmetrically, the recession shown with GE-NEG has a significant positive relationship in all models with the types of crime in our study, and its effect on CP is still greater than other crimes. The economic expansion coefficient shows that it has a small and uniform negative impact on CF and CR. Also, the contraction has almost the same but positive effect on CF and CR.

Due to the relationship between CF and CR and the small effect of expansion and contraction on them, it can be concluded that these two variables are stable to economic fluctuations. Therefore, if we are to use an economic indicator to control these crimes, economic fluctuations will not be the most appropriate, and employment indicators are much more effective.

The unemployment variable in the first two models CF and CR, are not statistically significant, which in the short-term model automatically excluded from the model by software. This variable in the third model present by a coefficient of approximately 545 and in the fourth model present by a coefficient of approximately 69. It means that by raising the unemployment population in British Columbia for 1000 people, about 545 and 69 numbers are added to CP and CV crimes, respectively. Therefore, job creation policies can help to control CP and CV. The inflation rate affected property crime and crime of violence similar to the unemployment. Police control policies have a stronger effect on reducing CP than other crime types. TU coefficient shows that the number of tourists has almost no effect on four crime types in our study.

Also, Table 4 shows that the GINI coefficient has a significant impact on CR and CP, but policies that reduce income inequality need to reform the tax system and administrative rules, which cannot be easily changed. Furthermore, each of the four models' error correction coefficients has a negative numerical value of less than one and shows that in each period, according to the numerical value, the percentage of imbalances disappears, and the model tends to balance. Finally, the results of heteroskedasticity, normality, and correlation tests also confirm the review and the absence of problems in the research models. Considering the SUSUM and SUSUMQ test results and placing the trend between the two upper and lower edge curves, we conclude that all four models are stable.

6. Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommandation

In this article, using the ARDL model, four models estimate in this research find the relation between four categories of crime and some effective variables that the basic articles confirm the models' causality. In the models, crime is a dependent variable, and the business cycle, unemployment, inflation rate, GINI coefficient, police officer, and tourist number are the independent variable. In this study, the hypothesis was whether contraction increases crime while expansion reduces it. The result

proved our original hypothesis. Generally, the study results suggest that the province's crime rates fluctuate only short-term compared to periods of prosperity or recession.

According to the results obtained from estimating the models, we find out that economic prosperity reduces society's crimes. Also, considering its coefficients, this effect is more for property crime than other crimes. Economic prosperity has many benefits, including increasing production, improving public services, reducing unemployment and poverty. It is possible that economic prosperity has increased household welfare and families' ability to provide ancillary products to establish property security like CCTV; it could be one of the reasons that CP reduced more than other crimes in our study.

The contraction has a slightly positive impact on CF and CR, while economic expansion negatively impacts. Because prosperity and recession have such a small impact on them, it seems that they are stable during the economic fluctuation. Hence, other factors must use to control these crimes, such as employment indicators. Generally, the result shows that criminal activity has increased during the economic recession; one of the reasons could be decreasing people's purchasing power during this time or decreasing the aggregate production of British Columbia. The effects of the recession can reduce social welfare as well as increased tensions and psychological pressures for people.

Our results indicate that unemployment affects CP and CV significantly but has no significant effect on CF and CR. Moreover, we find that inflation and the difference between social classes (GINI coefficient) have positively affected crime. The inflation coefficient shows that those who lost their purchasing power, have more committing crimes. According to our results, Class differences can also spiritually divert the lawful man from the right path and lead to corruption. In British Columbia, the number of tourists had little effect on crime, but the number of police had a negative impact on three offenses (CF, CP, CV) and were exceptionally high on property crimes. As a result, we can reduce the amount of property crime with a higher number of police officers.

According to our estimated models, by contributing to the expansion and controlling the recession, increasing job creation policies, police officers' number, inflation's control policies, crime could significantly reduce.

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Appendices:



Appendix 1. Population growth in BC

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ndix 2.	The adju	ısted da	ta from	1986 till	l 2019.				
UN	PO	INF	GINI	GE	CV	CR	СР	CF	TU
194.5	6770	66.7	0.395	85760	36438	3185	251096	13944	4067807
189.2	6987	68.7	0.395	89353	37205	3005	250351	12703	2699578
164.2	7026	71.2	0.374	93709	38676	3253	244330	12450	2903525
151	7068	74.4	0.362	98058	41530	3342	247384	13318	2982508
143.4	7073	78.4	0.395	102102	44944	3933	266230	15536	3118099
173.3	7393	82.6	0.392	103964	47428	4864	303874	16473	3184511
182.6	7466	84.8	0.411	107469	51523	4851	307698	16796	3208355
179.8	7562	87.8	0.403	110549	53989	5128	304047	15509	3291929
175.2	7726	89.5	0.405	114024	53699	5417	307571	15953	3571092
165.4	7586	91.6	0.404	116111	53300	5999	323747	15280	4050502
172.4	7767	92.4	0.421	120169	54791	6308	336871	14912	4251843
171.7	8073	93.1	0.42	123991	55299	5932	307489	14887	4470473
179.9	8231	93.4	0.423	125726	55112	6399	287816	13943	4681731
170.3	8147	94.4	0.429	128421	52922	6339	272508	12778	4862343
149.2	8087	96.1	0.427	132591	51983	5500	258822	11764	5041684
160.7	8389	97.7	0.439	135724	51068	5204	264461	12314	5021833
182	8464	100	0.454	140099	50973	5150	268979	13065	5134352
173.5	8615	102.2	0.437	143766	51640	5015	289113	14793	4735404
157.6	8667	104.2	0.437	148130	51670	5071	283356	15447	4946863
130	9124	106.3	0.432	153275	52990	5174	264907	15297	4884990
106.5	9584	108.1	0.42	160695	53878	5318	245128	15121	4877322
98.6	10214	110	0.41	169126	52457	5508	226164	14703	4781717
108.2	10341	112.3	0.409	174156	50187	5412	197581	14107	4519871
183.8	11095	112.3	0.424	174870	49575	5136	184837	14524	4105613
183.7	11417	113.8	0.429	180074	47508	4900	174859	13036	4302504
184.1	11600	116.5	0.42	183960	44934	4492	162677	12145	4168373
167.8	11604	117.8	0.418	187489	43224	4521	167534	11956	4221185
162.6	11487	117.7	0.419	191121	38691	3580	163253	12128	4307221
151.2	11308	118.9	0.414	195272	36492	3390	179397	13371	4566166
156.3	11324	120.2	0.416	202331	38231	3644	186217	15749	4926147
158.6	11410	122.4	0.4	208433	35949	2966	192992	17289	5532226
139.1	11608	125	0.411	217014	35672	2484	186692	17863	5693846
129	12203	128.4	0.405	222987	38776	2482	192155	20239	6057835
131.7	12253	131.4	0.403	227602	49041	2855	213171	22816	6361935
244.3	101275	132.4							841854
	ndix 2: UN 194.5 189.2 164.2 151 143.4 173.3 182.6 179.8 175.2 165.4 172.4 171.7 179.9 170.3 149.2 160.7 182 173.5 157.6 130 106.5 98.6 108.2 183.8 183.7 184.1 167.8 165.2 156.3 158.6 139.1 129 131.7 244.3	ndix 2. The adju PO 194.5 6770 189.2 6987 164.2 7026 151 7068 143.4 7073 173.3 7393 182.6 7466 179.8 7562 175.2 7726 165.4 7586 172.4 7767 171.7 8073 179.9 8231 170.3 8147 149.2 8087 160.7 8389 182 8464 173.5 8615 157.6 8667 130 9124 106.5 9584 98.6 10214 108.2 10341 183.8 11095 183.7 11417 184.1 11600 167.8 11604 162.6 11487 151.2 11308 156.3 11324 158.6 11410	ndix 2. The adjusted day 194.5 6770 66.7 189.2 6987 68.7 164.2 7026 71.2 151 7068 74.4 143.4 7073 78.4 173.3 7393 82.6 182.6 7466 84.8 179.8 7562 87.8 175.2 7726 89.5 165.4 7586 91.6 172.4 7767 92.4 171.7 8073 93.1 179.9 8231 93.4 170.3 8147 94.4 149.2 8087 96.1 160.7 8389 97.7 182 8464 100 173.5 8615 102.2 157.6 8667 104.2 130 9124 106.3 106.5 9584 108.1 98.6 10214 110 108.2 10341 112.3 <tr< td=""><td>ndix 2. 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CV CR CP CF 194.5 6770 66.7 0.395 885760 36438 3185 251096 13944 189.2 6987 68.7 0.395 89353 37205 3005 250351 12703 164.2 7026 71.2 0.374 93709 38676 3253 244330 12450 151 7068 74.4 0.362 98058 41530 3342 247384 13318 143.4 7073 78.4 0.395 102102 44944 3933 266230 15536 173.3 7393 82.6 0.392 103964 47428 4864 303874 16473 182.6 7466 84.8 0.411 10749 51523 4851 307698 16796 175.2 7726 89.5 0.402 12391 5999 323747 15280 171.7 8073</td>	ndix 2. The adjusted data from 1986 till 2019. PO INF GINI GE CV 194.5 6770 66.7 0.395 85760 36438 189.2 6987 68.7 0.395 89353 37205 164.2 7026 71.2 0.374 93709 38676 151 7068 74.4 0.362 98058 41530 143.4 7073 78.4 0.395 102102 44944 173.3 7393 82.6 0.392 103964 47428 182.6 7466 84.8 0.411 107469 51523 179.8 7562 87.8 0.403 11624 53699 165.4 7586 91.6 0.404 116111 53300 172.4 7767 92.4 0.421 12391 55299 179.9 8231 93.4 0.423 125726 55112 170.3 8147 94.4 0.429 128421 52	Inf Adjusted data from 1986 till 2019. UN PO INF GIN1 GE CV CR 194.5 6770 66.7 0.395 85760 36438 3185 189.2 6987 68.7 0.395 89353 37205 3005 164.2 7026 71.2 0.374 93709 38676 3253 151 7068 74.4 0.362 98058 41530 3342 143.4 7073 78.4 0.395 102102 44944 3933 173.3 7393 82.6 0.392 103964 47428 4864 182.6 7466 84.8 0.403 110549 53989 5128 175.2 7726 89.5 0.405 114024 5369 5417 165.4 7586 91.6 0.404 116111 53300 5992 172.4 7767 92.4 0.423 125726 55112 6399	Indix 2. The adjusted data from 1986 till 2019. CV CR CP 194.5 6770 66.7 0.395 85760 36438 3185 251096 189.2 6987 68.7 0.395 89353 37205 3005 250351 164.2 7026 71.2 0.374 93709 38676 3253 244330 151 7068 74.4 0.362 98058 41530 3342 247384 143.4 7073 784 0.395 102102 44944 3933 266230 173.3 7393 82.6 0.392 103964 47428 4864 303874 182.6 7466 84.8 0.411 107469 51523 4851 307698 179.8 7562 87.8 0.403 11624 53699 5417 307571 165.4 7586 91.6 0.404 116111 53300 5999 323747 172.4 7767 92.4 0.	Indix 2. The adjusted data from I986 till 2019. CV CR CP CF 194.5 6770 66.7 0.395 885760 36438 3185 251096 13944 189.2 6987 68.7 0.395 89353 37205 3005 250351 12703 164.2 7026 71.2 0.374 93709 38676 3253 244330 12450 151 7068 74.4 0.362 98058 41530 3342 247384 13318 143.4 7073 78.4 0.395 102102 44944 3933 266230 15536 173.3 7393 82.6 0.392 103964 47428 4864 303874 16473 182.6 7466 84.8 0.411 10749 51523 4851 307698 16796 175.2 7726 89.5 0.402 12391 5999 323747 15280 171.7 8073

Appendix 3. First Model output

ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test Dependent Variable: D(CF) Selected Model: ARDL Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend Date: 04/08/21 Time: 09:50 Sample: 1986 2020 Included observations: 31

Conditional Error Correction Regression

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
С	62522.08	8972.961	6.967831	0.0000
CF(-1)*	-0.176114	0.087026	-2.023692	0.0659
GE_NEG(-1)	-0.475105	0.345164	-1.376464	0.1938
GE_POS(-1)	0.027237	0.040508	0.672377	0.5141
GINI(-1)	-128996.8	36550.22	-3.529304	0.0042
PO(-1)	-3.896067	0.851470	-4.575694	0.0006
TU(-1)	0.000106	0.000530	0.199790	0.8450
UN(-1)	-2.876572	21.99553	-0.130780	0.8981
INF(-1)	283.4872	137.9329	2.055254	0.0623
D(GE_NEG)	0.142448	0.198070	0.719180	0.4858
D(GE_NEG(-1))	0.418871	0.172032	2.434842	0.0315
D(GE_POS)	-0.036670	0.052261	-0.701675	0.4963
D(GINI)	-75910.77	25231.46	-3.008576	0.0109
D(PO)	-0.311212	0.942682	-0.330135	0.7470
D(TU)	-0.000285	0.000991	-0.287891	0.7783
D(TU(-1))	-0.001903	0.000849	-2.241356	0.0447
D(UN)	16.51902	16.86427	0.979528	0.3467
D(UN(-1))	28.00331	13.74514	2.037325	0.0643
D(INF)	-95.81599	194.5520	-0.492496	0.6313

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

Levels Equation

Case 2: Restricted Constant and	1 INO	Trend
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Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
GE_NEG	-2.697715	2.766631	-0.975090	0.3488
GE_POS	0.154654	0.230376	0.671311	0.5147
GINI	-732462.7	390200.7	-1.877144	0.0850
РО	-22.12243	12.32206	-1.795351	0.0978
TU	0.000602	0.003126	0.192440	0.8506
UN	-16.33359	127.1395	-0.128470	0.8999
INF	1609.681	1100.563	1.462598	0.1693
С	355009.4	172429.1	2.058871	0.0619
	=	=	=	=

$$\begin{split} EC = CF - (-2.6977*GE_NEG + 0.1547*GE_POS & -732462.7135*GINI \\ -22.1224*PO + 0.0006*TU & -16.3336*UN + 1609.6813*INF + \\ 355009.3898 \,) \end{split}$$

F-Bounds Test	Null Hypoth	Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship			
Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)	
			Asymptotic n=1000	:	
F-statistic	1.84933	10%	1.92	2.89	
k	7	5%	2.17	3.21	
		2.5%	2.43	3.51	
		1%	2.73	3.9	

ARDL Error Correction Regression Dependent Variable: D(CF) Selected Model: ARDL Case 5: Unrestricted Constant and Unrestricted Trend Date: 04/08/21 Time: 09:53 Sample: 1986 2020 Included observations: 31

ECM Regression

Case 5: Unrestricted Constant and Unrestricted Trend

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
С	43327.82	4473.551	9.685330	0.0000
@TREND	-434.1161	49.79308	-8.718402	0.0000
D(GE_NEG)	0.267687	0.094894	2.820895	0.0136
D(GE_POS)	-0.088433	0.040939	-2.160109	0.0486
D(PO)	-2.128661	0.652289	-3.263370	0.0057
D(TU)	-0.002031	0.000598	-3.398073	0.0043
CointEq(-1)*	-0.463530	0.047291	-9.801651	0.0000
R-squared	0.877952	Mean depen	ident var	334.3871
Adjusted R-squared	0.816928	S.D. depend	lent var	1143.185
S.E. of regression	489.1332	Akaike info	criterion	15.49457
Sum squared resid	4785027.	Schwarz criterion		16.00340
Log likelihood	-229.1658	Hannan-Qu	inn criter.	15.66044
F-statistic	14.38703	Durbin-Wat	son stat	2.307671
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship		
Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)

9.607237	10%	2.53	3.59
6	5%	2.87	4
	2.5%	3.19	4.38
	1%	3.6	4.9
	9.607237 6	9.607237 10% 6 5% 2.5% 1%	9.607237 10% 2.53 6 5% 2.87 2.5% 3.19 1% 3.6



Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:

F-statistic	2.521263	Prob. F(2,12)	0.1219

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey

F-statistic	0.780397	Prob. F(16,14)	0.6856
Obs*R-squared	14.61420	Prob. Chi-Square(16)	0.5531

Ramsey RESET Test

Equation: UNTITLED

Specification: CF CF(-1) GE_NEG GE_POS GINI INF PO TU UN C

Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values

	Value	df	Probability
t-statistic	0.076168	23	0.9399
F-statistic	0.005802	(1, 23)	0.9399



Appendix 4. Second Model output

ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test Dependent Variable: D(CR) Selected Model: ARDL Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend Date: 04/08/21 Time: 10:30 Sample: 1986 2020 Included observations: 31

Conditional Error Correction Regression				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
С	-18730.01	9719.450	-1.927065	0.0802
CR(-1)*	-1.030825	0.323978	-3.181774	0.0087
GE_NEG(-1)	-0.033511	0.144379	-0.232104	0.8207
GE_POS(-1)	-0.082539	0.028437	-2.902532	0.0144
GINI(-1)	5978.439	21656.54	0.276057	0.7876
INF(-1)	230.8353	67.60740	3.414350	0.0058
PO(-1)	0.610029	0.767570	0.794753	0.4436
TU(-1)	0.000411	0.000333	1.234349	0.2428

UN**	-7.910483	9.264784	-0.853823	0.4114
D(CR(-1))	0.608898	0.292348	2.082787	0.0614
D(GE_NEG)	-0.163752	0.124370	-1.316650	0.2147
D(GE_POS)	-0.086694	0.025582	-3.388851	0.0060
D(GE_POS(-1))	0.083379	0.035357	2.358169	0.0379
D(GINI)	19589.93	14042.17	1.395078	0.1905
D(INF)	226.4077	97.77460	2.315608	0.0409
D(INF(-1))	-315.5117	125.6366	-2.511304	0.0289
D(PO)	0.063254	0.564141	0.112124	0.9127
D(PO(-1))	0.950280	0.405371	2.344220	0.0389
D(TU)	0.000602	0.000582	1.034021	0.3233
D(TU(-1))	0.000546	0.000398	1.370091	0.1980

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).

C	Levels Equations Levels Equations the second	ation ant and No Trend		
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
GE_NEG	-0.032509	0.140532	-0.231326	0.8213
GE_POS	-0.080071	0.015756	-5.082064	0.0004
GINI	5799.666	20061.78	0.289090	0.7779
INF	223.9326	75.47054	2.967153	0.0128
РО	0.591787	0.641480	0.922534	0.3760
TU	0.000399	0.000245	1.626872	0.1320
UN	-7.673936	8.058683	-0.952257	0.3614
С	-18169.93	5139.815	-3.535133	0.0047

$$\begin{split} EC = CR - (-0.0325*GE_NEG -0.0801*GE_POS + 5799.6662*GINI + \\ 223.9326*INF + 0.5918*PO + 0.0004*TU -7.6739*UN -18169.9326 \,) \end{split}$$

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypoth	esis: No levels re	elationship
Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
		Asy	mptotic: =1000	
F-statistic	1.062473	10%	1.92	2.89
k	7	5%	2.17	3.21
		2.5%	2.43	3.51
		1%	2.73	3.9

ARDL Error Correction Regression Dependent Variable: D(CR) Selected Model: ARDL Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend Date: 04/08/21 Time: 10:31

Sample: 1986 2020 Included observations: 31

ECM Regression Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
D(GE_NEG) D(GE_POS) D(GINI) D(INF) D(PO) D(TU) CointEq(-1)*	0.163752 -0.086694 19589.93 226.4077 0.950280 0.000602 -0.030825	0.044130 0.010235 6539.730 50.37202 0.218454 0.000193 0.149399	3.710690 -8.470740 2.995525 4.494711 4.350022 3.125047 -6.899821	0.0034 0.0000 0.0122 0.0009 0.0012 0.0097 0.0000
R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood Durbin-Watson stat	0.870258 0.795145 188.1721 672766.3 -198.7572 2.797024	Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var Akaike info criterion Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter.		-12.83871 415.7496 13.59724 14.15233 13.77818

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship		
Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
F-statistic	3.062473	10%	1.92	2.89
k	7	5%	2.17	3.21
		2.5%	2.43	3.51
		1%	2.73	3.9



Series: Residuals Sample 1989 2019				
Observations	31			
Mean	8.45e-12			
Median	-4.995308			
Maximum	333.8115			
Minimum	-345.2953			
Std. Dev.	149.7516			
Skewness	0.181557			
Kurtosis 3.208077				
Jarque-Bera	0.226232			
Probability	0.893047			

F-statistic	2.574056	Prob. F(3,8)	0.1267
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH			
F-statistic Obs*R-squared	1.532643 1.556897	Prob. F(1,28) Prob. Chi-Square(1)	0.2260 0.2121

Ramsey RESET Test

Equation: UNTITLED

Specification: CR CR(-1) CR(-2) GE_NEG GE_NEG(-1) GE_POS

GE_POS(-1) GE_POS(-2) GINI GINI(-1) INF INF(-1) INF(-2) PO PO(-1)

PO(-2) TU TU(-1) TU(-2) UN C

Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values

	Value	df	Probability
t-statistic	1.309222	10	0.2197
F-statistic	1.714063	(1, 10)	0.2197



Appendix 5. Third Model output

ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test Dependent Variable: D(CP) Selected Model: ARDL Case 1: No Constant and No Trend Date: 04/08/21 Time: 11:05 Sample: 1986 2020 Included observations: 32

Conditional Error Correction Regression				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
CP(-1)*	-0.218028	0.113213	-1.925825	0.0685
GE_NEG(-1)	-8.466111	3.183966	-2.658983	0.0151
GE_POS**	-0.724003	0.461463	-1.568930	0.1324
INF(-1)	3718.808	1575.440	2.360488	0.0285
PO**	-27.52235	8.509834	-3.234181	0.0042
TU**	0.006412	0.007229	0.887043	0.3856
UN(-1)	-235.8035	227.0540	-1.038535	0.3114
GINI**	-54408.78	302257.9	-0.180008	0.8590
D(GE_NEG)	-3.893842	3.188008	-1.221403	0.2361
D(INF)	7022.814	3169.887	2.215478	0.0385
D(INF(-1))	6544.879	2687.704	2.435119	0.0244
D(UN)	9.171572	221.8404	0.041343	0.9674

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).

Levels Equation Case 1: No Constant and No Trend				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
GE_NEG	-38.83046	27.62252	-1.405754	0.1751
GE_POS	-3.320694	2.829193	-1.173725	0.2543
INF	17056.59	11385.48	1.498101	0.1497
РО	-126.2333	63.08776	-2.000916	0.0592
TU	0.029409	0.035555	0.827155	0.4179
UN	-1081.531	1250.108	-0.865150	0.3972
GINI	-249550.0	1437170.	-0.173640	0.8639

EC = CP - (-38.8305*GE_NEG -3.3207*GE_POS + 17056.5939*INF

-126.2333*PO + 0.0294*TU - 1081.5306*UN - 249549.9775*GINI)

F-Bounds Test

Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship

Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
		Asyn n=	nptotic: 1000	
F-statistic	1.117806	10%	1.7	2.83
k	7	5%	1.97	3.18
		2.5%	2.22	3.49
		1%	2.54	3.91
ARDL Error Correction Regression Dependent Variable: D(CP) Selected Model: ARDL Case 1: No Constant and No Trend Date: 04/08/21 Time: 10:59 Sample: 1986 2020 Included observations: 29				
Variable	ECM Re Case 1: No Const Coefficient	gression ant and No Trend Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
D(GE_NEG)	11.37231	1.960446	5.800878	0.0102
D(GE_POS)	-5.218253	0.589761	-8.848080	0.0030
D(INF)	5841.401	1387.548	4.209874	0.0245
D(PO)	-109.1326	9.540759	-11.43856	0.0014
D(TU)	-0.041570	0.006286	-6.613319	0.0070
D(UN)	545.6151	138.2766	3.945825	0.0290
D(GINI(-1))	1949071.	269763.0	7.225123	0.0055
CointEq(-1)*	0.083028	0.006827	12.16105	0.0012
R-squared	0.982166	Mean dependent var		-1829.621
Adjusted R-squared	0.950066	S.D. dependent var		16015.28
S.E. of regression	3578.779	Akaike info criterion		19.44907
Sum squared resid	1.28E+08	Schwarz criterion		20.34488
Log likelihood	-263.0114	Hannan-Quinn criter.		19.7296

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

Durbin-Watson stat

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship		
Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
F-statistic	5.545917	10%	1.7	2.83
k	7	5%	1.97	3.18
		2.5%	2.22	3.49
		1%	2.54	3.91

2.928811



10000

15000

20000

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:

-5000

ò

F-statistic	0.578447	Prob. F(2,18)	0.5709
Obs*R-squared	1.932497	Prob. Chi-Square(2)	0.3805

5000

Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH

-10000

F-statistic	2.719540	Prob. F(1,29)	0.1099
Obs*R-squared	2.657848	Prob. Chi-Square(1)	0.1030

Ramsey RESET Test

-15000

Equation: UNTITLED

Specification: CP CP(-1) GE_NEG GE_NEG(-1) GE_POS INF INF(-1) INF(

-2) PO TU UN UN(-1) GINI

Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values

t-statistic 1.169223 19 0.2568 F-statistic 1.367082 (1, 19) 0.2568		Value	df	Probability
F-statistic 1.367082 (1, 19) 0.2568	t-statistic	1.169223	19	0.2568
	F-statistic	1.367082	(1, 19)	0.2568



Appendix 6. Fourth Model output

ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test Dependent Variable: D(CV) Selected Model: ARDL Case 1: No Constant and No Trend Date: 04/08/21 Time: 11:12 Sample: 1986 2020 Included observations: 31

Conditional Error Correction Regression					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.	
CV(-1)*	-0.656787	0.196785	-3.337584	0.0053	
GE_NEG(-1)	-2.315546	0.871102	-2.658181	0.0197	
GE_POS(-1)	-0.543002	0.162400	-3.343607	0.0053	
INF(-1)	1584.132	501.2074	3.160632	0.0075	
PO(-1)	-1.502660	3.059741	-0.491107	0.6315	
TU(-1)	0.005503	0.001690	3.256738	0.0062	
UN(-1)	-145.1792	57.70876	-2.515722	0.0258	
GINI**	-164103.3	78911.82	-2.079578	0.0579	
D(CV(-1))	1.099476	0.262762	4.184302	0.0011	
D(GE_NEG)	-1.532348	0.654040	-2.342898	0.0357	
D(GE_POS)	0.070373	0.199964	0.351929	0.7305	
D(GE_POS(-1))	0.908162	0.275355	3.298145	0.0058	
D(INF)	-472.9024	643.2388	-0.735189	0.4753	
D(PO)	-7.151111	2.818709	-2.537016	0.0248	

31

D(PO(-1))	4.811553	3.693876	1.302576	0.2153
D(TU)	0.000113	0.002631	0.042977	0.9664
D(UN)	16.81781	53.47687	0.314487	0.7581
D(UN(-1))	79.14419	47.45874	1.667642	0.1193

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).

Levels Equation Case 1: No Constant and No Trend				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
GE_NEG	-3.525568	1.606060	-2.195167	0.0469
GE_POS	-0.826756	0.217217	-3.806135	0.0022
INF	2411.943	575.2731	4.192692	0.0011
РО	-2.287896	4.716588	-0.485074	0.6357
TU	0.008378	0.003032	2.763422	0.0161
UN	-221.0447	97.30276	-2.271721	0.0407
GINI	-249857.8	106782.8	-2.339868	0.0359

$$\begin{split} EC &= CV - (-3.5256*GE_NEG -0.8268*GE_POS + 2411.9433*INF -2.2879*PO \\ &+ 0.0084*TU -221.0447*UN -249857.7658*GINI) \end{split}$$

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypot	hesis: No levels re	elationship
Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
		Asy	ymptotic: n=1000	
F-statistic	1.458411	10%	1.7	2.83
k	7	5%	1.97	3.18
		2.5%	2.22	3.49
		1%	2.54	3.91
ARDL Error Correction Regr	ression			
Dependent Variable: D(CV)				
Selected Model: ARDL				
Case 4: Unrestricted Constan	t and Restricted Trend			
Date: 04/08/21 Time: 11:14				
Sample: 1986 2020				
Included observations: 31				
	ECM Regre	ssion		

Case 4: Unrestricted Constant and Restricted Trend				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
С	-289330.1	32033.58	-9.032087	0.0001

0.614437	0.248650	2.471093	0.0484	
-0.169603	0.066402	-2.554169	0.0432	
636.4749	246.9853	2.576975	0.0419	
-2.736427	1.132251	-2.416801	0.0521	
0.008125	0.001411	5.760042	0.0012	
69.03479	17.95916	3.843988	0.0085	
-0.300118	0.257338	-8.938120	0.0001	
0.956819	Mean dependent var		334.3548	
0.907470	S.D. dependent var		2754.884	
838.0007	Akaike info criterion		16.60176	
0001100	Schwarz criterion		17.38814	
9831432.	Schwarz criterion		17.38814	
9831432. -240.3273	Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter.		17.38814 16.85810	
9831432. -240.3273 19.38872	Schwarz criterion Hannan-Quinn criter. Durbin-Watson stat		17.38814 16.85810 2.297083	
	0.614437 -0.169603 636.4749 -2.736427 0.008125 69.03479 -0.300118 0.956819 0.907470 838.0007	0.614437 0.248650 -0.169603 0.066402 636.4749 246.9853 -2.736427 1.132251 0.008125 0.001411 69.03479 17.95916 -0.300118 0.257338 0.956819 Mean dependent var 0.907470 S.D. dependent var 838.0007 Akaike info criterion	0.614437 0.248650 2.471093 -0.169603 0.066402 -2.554169 636.4749 246.9853 2.576975 -2.736427 1.132251 -2.416801 0.008125 0.001411 5.760042 69.03479 17.95916 3.843988 -0.300118 0.257338 -8.938120 0.956819 Mean dependent var 0.907470 S.D. dependent var 838.0007 Akaike info criterion	

* p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution.

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypoth	nesis: No levels re	elationship
Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
F-statistic	3.804285	10%	2.22	3.17
k	7	5%	2.5	3.5
		2.5%	2.76	3.81
		1%	3.07	4.23



Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:				
F-statistic	6.086272	Prob. F(3,3)	0.0861	
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH				
F-statistic Obs*R-squared	0.509984 0.536637	Prob. F(1,28) Prob. Chi-Square(1)	0.4811 0.4638	

Ramsey RESET Test

Equation: UNTITLED

```
Specification: CV CV(-1) CV(-2) GE_NEG GE_NEG(-1) GE_NEG(-2)
GE_POS GE_POS(-1) GE_POS(-2) INF INF(-1) INF(-2) PO PO(-1) PO(
-2) TU TU(-1) TU(-2) UN UN(-1) UN(-2) GINI GINI(-1) GINI(-2) C
@TREND
```

Omitted Variables: Powers of fitted values from 2 to 4

